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1 Introduction
The literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty pioneered by Arrow and Fisher
[2] and Henry [12] is based on the premise that three factors mainly influence the investment
decision. First, there is some uncertainty about the cash-flows that the investment project
will generate. Next, investment is at least partially irreversible, in the sense that investment
expenditures cannot be fully recovered. Last, there is some degree of flexibility in the timing
of investment, which is valuable because it gives the decision-maker the option to wait for new
information. The loss of this option value when investment occurs represents an additional
opportunity cost of investment. As a result, investment options are exercised significantly
above the point at which expected discounted cash-flows cover sunk capital costs, in contrast
with the usual net present value rule.
In the benchmark case of a single indivisible project, the optimal investment policy can be
mathematically determined as the solution of an optimal stopping problem. The prototype
of this approach is the model of McDonald and Siegel [20], in which the underlying value of
the investment project evolves as a geometric Brownian motion. Under this formulation, the
optimal investment strategy is a trigger strategy. Specifically, the investment option should
be exercised at the first time at which the value of the investment project reaches a critical
threshold that can be explicitly computed using standard smooth-fit techniques (Dixit and
Pindyck [8]).
The large and rapidly growing literature on real options has recently emphasized the
sequential nature of investment decisions (Majd and Pindyck [19], Bar-Ilan and Strange [3]),
the importance of incremental capacity choice (Pindyck [22], Kandel and Pearson [14]), and
addressed issues like entry and exit decisions (Dixit [6]), costly reversibility (Abel and Eberly
[1]), technology adoption (Farzin, Huisman and Kort [10]), and learning (De´camps, Mariotti
and Villeneuve [4]).
In this paper, we leave aside these complex and meaningful extensions of the theory
and revisit an old simple problem, namely the choice between mutually exclusive investment
projects under uncertainty. Despite its simplicity, this is still a topical question, as illustrated
for instance by Dias’ [5] recent survey of real options in the petroleum industry.
The starting point of our analysis is the model of Dixit [7]. In his model, a decision-
maker has to choose among alternative projects of different scales. The instantaneous cash-
flow generated by any of these projects is a linear function of a single geometric Brownian
motion that represents the dynamics of the output price, and of the constant output flow of
the project. Projects with larger sunk capital costs are associated with larger output flows
and, once installed, a project incurs no operating costs. When the decision-maker decides
to invest, he naturally selects the project with the highest net present value. Therefore, his
underlying payoff function is the upper envelope of the family of affine functions representing
the net present values of investing in each project given the current output price.
Dixit’s solution to this problem relies on a simple adaptation of the single project case
studied by McDonald and Siegel [20]. Specifically, he argues that each project should be
evaluated separately, and that the solution to the investment problem is simply to choose the
project with the highest option value. As an illustration, suppose there are two projects, 1
and 2. One could for instance think of these two projects as alternative ways of producing
electricity, by using a gas or a nuclear technology. Project 1 entails a lower sunk capital cost
and generates a lower output flow than project 2. Separate evaluation of these two projects
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leads to two option values, and associated critical investment thresholds p1 and p2 for the
output price, which is here the relevant state variable. According to Dixit, the solution of
the investment problem is then twofold.
(i) If the initial output price is low enough, it is optimal to invest in the project that has
the highest option value, at the first time at which the corresponding threshold p1 or
p2 is reached by the output price.
(ii) For values of the initial output price greater than this optimal threshold, the project
with the highest net present value is selected and investment is immediate.
While our solution coincides with Dixit’s in case (i), we find that (ii) is questionable. Our
counter-argument is as follows. Suppose that project 1 has a higher option value than project
2, which typically occurs if project 1 generates only a marginally lower output flow than
project 2, but entails a significantly lower sunk capital cost. In particular, when the current
output price is p1, the decision-maker is strictly better off investing in project 1 than in
project 2, so that p1 is below the indifference point for which the net present values of the
two projects are equal. We show that it is never optimal to invest in either project when
the output price is at this indifference point, thus contradicting part (ii) of Dixit’s solution.
The reason is that the underlying payoff function of the decision-maker is not differentiable
at the indifference point, where it exhibits an upward derivative jump. Using a local time
argument, we show that this implies the optimality of delaying investment for values of the
current output price in the neighborhood of this point.
As a result, when the option value of investing in project 1 is higher than that of investing
in project 2, the optimal investment strategy is no longer a trigger strategy, and the optimal
investment region in the state space is not connected. Instead, the optimal investment region
is dichotomous. Specifically, there are two critical thresholds p3 and p4 around the indifference
point such that if the current output price lies in [p1, p3], it is optimal to invest in project 1,
while if the current output price lies in [p4,∞), it is optimal to invest in project 2. It should
be noted that, for values of the output price below p3, Dixit’s solution remains correct. In
particular, when the initial output price is below p1, it is optimal to wait until the output
price reaches p1, and then to invest in project 1. By contrast, the intermediate region (p3, p4)
is an inaction region in which the decision-maker waits to see in which project to invest.
When the initial output price lies in (p3, p4), two scenarios can therefore occur. If the output
price raises to p4 before hitting p3, the decision-maker will invest in project 2. By contrast,
if the output price falls to p3 before hitting p4, the decision-maker will invest in project 1.
Under these circumstances, the eventual project choice is therefore path-dependent.
The existence of the intermediate inaction region (p3, p4) implies that, in striking contrast
with most standard real option models, it can be optimal to invest in a project even though
the instantaneous profit flow associated to this project falls. Investing in project 1 when
the output price falls down to p3 is optimal because p3 is higher than the output price
threshold p1 above which it would be optimal to invest in project 1 if that were the only
investment option available, and because it would be too costly to wait until the threshold
p4 is reached to invest in project 2–in other terms, “a bird in the hand is worth two in the
bush.” Moreover, there is a region of the state space in which it is optimal to delay investment
while it would be optimal to invest if only one project, 1 or 2, were available. This illustrates
again the interaction between the two investment options, which is not taken into account by
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Dixit’s solution. Adding a new investment option to an existing one increases the demand for
information and creates an additional incentive to delay investment, even if, when evaluated
separately, the second option is dominated by the first.
As pointed out above, a sufficient condition for the dichotomy of the optimal investment
region is that project 1 generates only a marginally lower output flow than project 2, but
entails a significantly lower sunk capital cost. Alternatively, one could fix the output and
cost parameters of the model, and investigate under which conditions on the underlying
output price process the optimal investment region is dichotomous. It turns out that, if the
volatility of the output price process is high enough, the optimal investment region is never
dichotomous and, no matter the current output price, it is never optimal to invest in project
1. Thus, holding the output and cost parameters of the model fixed, the dichotomy of the
optimal investment region requires a relatively low volatility of the output price process. More
generally, greater volatility systematically leads to the adoption of larger projects. However,
this result holds because in Dixit’s original model, the decision-maker cannot switch from
one project to the other. By contrast, we show that, whenever the decision-maker has the
option to switch from project 1 to project 2 by incurring the corresponding sunk capital cost,
there are output and cost parameters such that the dichotomy of the optimal investment
region is preserved and investment in project 1 occurs with positive probability even for a
very high volatility of the output price process. This suggests that greater volatility does not
systematically lead to the adoption of larger projects when the decision-maker has the option
to increase the scale of his operations as price conditions improve.
2 The basic model
2.1 The investment problem
Our basic setup and notation are directly in line with Dixit [7]. We simplify his model by
assuming that only two alternative investment projects are available. Time is continuous,
and labelled by t ≥ 0. A single risk-neutral decision-maker can invest in one of two projects,
i ∈ {1, 2}, of different scales. Project 2 generates a higher output flow than project 1, but
entails a higher sunk capital cost. Formally, each project i generates an output flow Xi > 0,
with X2 > X1, and entails a sunk capital cost Ki > 0, with K2 > K1. A project once
installed incurs no operating costs. The instantaneous cash-flow generated by project i is
PtXi, where P = {Pt; t ≥ 0} is a geometric Brownian motion with drift µ and volatility σ,
dPt = µPtdt+ σPtdWt; t ≥ 0,
that represents the dynamics of output price. The decision-maker discounts future revenues
and costs at a constant rate ρ > µ. A project once installed lasts for ever and, in the basic
version of the model, there is no option to switch from the smaller scale project 1 to the
larger scale project 2 once the former has been installed. Hence, for a current value p of the
output price, the net expected discounted profit of investing in project i is given by:
Vi(p) =
pXi
ρ− µ −Ki; p ≥ 0. (1)
When contemplating investment, the decision-maker will select the project which generates
the highest net expected discounted profit, given the current output price. So the value of
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investing is given by the upper envelope of V1 and V2:
V (p) = max{V1(p), V2(p)}; p ≥ 0. (2)
We denote by:
p˜ =
(ρ− µ)(K2 −K1)
X2 −X1
(3)
the output price level at which the decision-maker is indifferent between investing in either
project. In particular, V2(p) ≥ V1(p) if and only if p ≥ p˜. Note that V is not differentiable at
the indifference point p˜, with D+V (p˜) = X2/(ρ− µ) > X1/(ρ− µ) = D−V (p˜).
Let T P be the set of stopping times adapted to the filtration generated by the output
price P . The decision-maker’s investment problem can then be written as:
V(p) = sup
τ∈T P
E
£
e−ρτV (P pτ )
¤
; p ≥ 0, (4)
where the superscript p in P pt reflects the dependence of P on its initial value p. Let us denote
by S = {p > 0 | V(p) = V (p)} the stopping region for (4), and by τS = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ∈ S}
the associated stopping time. Since ρ > µ, the process {e−ρtV(P pt ); t ≥ 0} is uniformly
integrable and converges almost surely to 0 (see Appendix). A sufficient condition for τS to
be an optimal stopping time for (4) is then that S be non-empty (El Karoui [9]). We have
the following result.
Proposition 2.1 The stopping region S for (4) is non-empty.
Having shown the existence of a solution to (4), we now characterize the stopping region
S. Before that, it will be helpful to summarize Dixit’s approach to this problem.
2.2 Dixit’s solution
The solution proposed by Dixit to (4) is as follows. Relying on Itoˆ’s lemma, he argues that,
on the continuation region R+ \ S, V must be of the form Bpβ, where:
β =
1
2
− µ
σ2
+
sµ
1
2
− µ
σ2
¶2
+
2ρ
σ2
> 1
is as usual the positive root of the quadratic equation:
q(ξ) =
1
2
σ2ξ(ξ − 1) + µξ − ρ = 0. (5)
The optimal value of B is determined as the highest B such that the contact condition
V (p) = Bpβ is satisfied for some p ≥ 0. Since V is an upper envelope of affine functions and
Bpβ is a convex function of p as β > 1, the contact between V and V cannot occur at the
indifference point p˜. Thus one needs only to compute the tangency points of functions of the
form Bip
β with each of the affine functions Vi, and select the one with the highest Bi. That
is, one solves, for each i:
Bip
β
i =
piXi
ρ− µ −Ki, (6)
βBipβ−1i =
Xi
ρ− µ, (7)
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which leads to:
pi =
β
β − 1
Ki(ρ− µ)
Xi
, (8)
Bi =
·
Xi
(ρ− µ)β
¸βµβ − 1
Ki
¶β−1
. (9)
Dixit’s solution is then as follows. Let i¯ be the project for which Xβi /K
β−1
i is the largest.
Then, if the initial output price p is below pi¯, the decision-maker should wait until the output
price reaches pi¯, and then invest in project i¯. If the initial output price p is above pi¯, the
decision-maker should immediately invest in the best available project. In other terms, the
stopping region S is of the form [pi¯,∞), and for any p ∈ S, the decision-maker should invest
in the project for which Vi(p) is the largest. In particular, the optimal investment strategy
would then be a simple trigger strategy, as when a single investment project is available
(McDonald and Siegel [20]).
Remark. There is a direct link between Dixit’s solution and that of the problem of
investing in a single project with output flow Xi and sunk capital cost Ki:
Vi(p) = sup
τ∈T P
E
£
e−ρτVi(P
p
τ )
¤
; p ≥ 0. (10)
Standard computations (Dixit and Pindyck [8]) show that the solution to (10) consists to
invest as soon as the output price reaches pi, and that Vi(p) = Bipβ for p ≤ pi. Equivalently,
Vi(p) =



µ
p
pi
¶β Ki
β − 1 if p ≤ pi,
pXi
ρ− µ −Ki if p > pi.
(11)
Conditions (6) and (7) correspond respectively to the usual value-matching and smooth-
pasting conditions for (10). Hence, Dixit’s solution essentially consists to evaluate separately
the two investment options on each project, and then to select the project with the highest
option value.
2.3 A counter-argument
To rule out the relatively uninteresting case in which, no matter the current output price, it
is never optimal to invest in project 1, and therefore τ = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ≥ p2} is an optimal
stopping time for (4), let us from now on assume that:
Xβ1
Kβ−11
>
Xβ2
Kβ−12
. (12)
According to Dixit’s solution, the stopping region S should then be [p1,∞). In particular,
p1 < p˜ and thus the indifference point p˜ belongs to S (otherwise, it would never be optimal
to invest in project 1). However, one has the following result.
Proposition 2.2 The indifference point p˜ never belongs to the stopping region S for (4).
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The proof of this result is technical, and relies on a local time argument based on the
Itoˆ—Tanaka—Meyer formula (Karatzas and Shreve [15, Theorem 3.7.1]). The intuition is that,
because the payoff function V defined by (2) is not differentiable at the indifference point p˜,
with D+V (p˜) > D−V (p˜), the decision-maker is always better off delaying investment when
the current output price is p˜ rather than investing in either project. As shown below, this
implies that whenever (12) holds, the stopping region S is not connected, and the optimal
investment strategy is not a trigger strategy, contrary to Dixit’s solution.
Remark. An alternative way of deriving Proposition 2.2 is as follows. From optimal
stopping theory, the process {e−ρtV(P pt ); t ≥ 0} is a supermartingale (El Karoui [9]). This
implies that:
AV ≤ 0
in the sense of distributions on R++,1 where the operator A is defined by:
Ag = 1
2
σ2p2D2g + µpDg − ρg (13)
(Jaillet, Lamberton and Lapeyre [13]). In particular, on the interior of the stopping region
S, one has, in the sense of distributions:
AV = AV ≤ 0. (14)
The distribution AV can be explicitly computed as follows:
AV = (−pX1 + ρK1)1[0,p˜) + (−pX2 + ρK2)1(p˜,∞) +
X2 −X1
ρ− µ δp˜,
where the Dirac mass δp˜ reflects the derivative jump of V at p˜. Suppose now that S = [p1,∞),
as prescribed by Dixit’s solution under (12). Then p˜ > p1 and, for any non-negative function
φ ∈ C∞K (R+) with support [p˜− ε, p˜+ ε] ⊂ (p1,∞),
hAV ,φi=
Z p˜+ε
p˜−ε
(−pX2 + ρK2)φ(p) dp+
X2 −X1
ρ− µ φ(p˜).
Choosing ε small enough and φ(p˜) large enough, it follows that hAV ,φi> 0, which contradicts
(14). It follows that the stopping region S cannot be of the prescribed form.
2.4 The optimal investment region
We are now ready to state and prove our main result.
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that (12) holds. Then:
(i) The stopping region S for (4) is the union of two disjoint intervals [p1, p3] and [p4,∞),
where p1 is given by (8) and p3 < p˜ < p4. If the current output price lies in [p1, p3],
it is optimal to invest in project 1, while if it lies in [p4,∞), it is optimal to invest in
project 2;
1Recall that a distribution T on an open set Ω ⊂ R++ is a linear form on the space C∞K (Ω) of infinitely
differentiable functions on Ω with compact support that satisfies the following property: for any sequence {φn}
of functions in C∞K (Ω) whose supports are contained in a fixed compact subset of Ω, and such that the sequence
{Dkφn} converges uniformly to 0 for every k ∈ N, the sequence {hT,φni} converges to 0 (see for instance
Ziemer [23, Definition 1.7.1]). The notation T ≤ 0 means that hT,φi≤ 0 for any non-negative φ ∈ C∞K (Ω).
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(ii) The value function V for (4) is continuously differentiable on R++ and satisfies the
following variational inequalities:
AV ≤ 0, (15)
V ≥ V, (16)
(V − V )AV = 0, (17)
where the operator A is given by (13). In particular, V coincides with V1 on [0, p3],
and p3 and p4 are characterized by the following value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions:
V(p3) = V1(p3), (18)
V(p4) = V2(p4), (19)
DV(p3) = DV1(p3), (20)
DV(p4) = DV2(p4). (21)
The key insight of this result is that, whenever (12) holds, the optimal investment strategy
is not a trigger strategy, and the optimal investment region is dichotomous. It should be noted
that Dixit’s solution remains valid on the segment [0, p1] of the state space. If the output
price initially belongs to that region, it is optimal to wait until it reaches p1 to invest in
project 1. However, our solution departs from his in that there is a range of prices (p3, p4)
around the indifference point p˜ in which it is optimal for the decision-maker to wait in order
to decide in which project to invest. Note that if project 2 were not immediately available,
it would be optimal to invest in project 1 in that region. Thus delay in the region (p3, p4)
reflects the added opportunity to invest in project 2. Moreover, it is not difficult to check
that p4 > p2 if (12) holds, so that for values of the output price in (p2, p4), the decision-maker
chooses to delay investment although he would have invested immediately if only one project,
1 or 2, were available. This illustrates the interaction between the two investment options:
the decision-maker is ready to delay further investment in project 2 because he knows that
he will have the option to invest in project 1 if the output price deteriorates too much. Note
that this remains true despite the fact that, on the interval [0, p˜), the option of investing
in project 1 uniformly dominates that of investing in project 2 when these two options are
evaluated separately, that is, V1 > V2 on this price range.
As shown on Figure 1, the value function V coincides with V1 on [0, p1], then takes off
from V1 on (p3, p4) and touches down V2 at the point p4. On the interval [0, p1], V is of the
form B1p
β, where B1 is given by (9). On the interval [p3, p4], it follows from (15)—(17) that
V is of the form Apα +Bpβ, where:
α =
1
2
− µ
σ2
−
sµ
1
2
− µ
σ2
¶2
+
2ρ
σ2
7
is the negative root of the quadratic equation (5). The coefficients A and B, as well as
the critical investment thresholds p3 and p4, can be found in principle by solving the value-
matching and smooth-pasting conditions (18)—(21), although no analytic solution is available.
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2.5 Discussion
Condition (12) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal investment region to be
dichotomous in Dixit’s model when there are two alternative projects. For a fixed value of
β, (12) holds if project 1 generates only a marginally lower output flow than project 2, but
entails a significantly lower sunk capital cost. If (12) does not hold, then the option value
of investing in project 2, V2, uniformly dominates the payoff of investing in project 1, V1, so
that it never pays to select project 1. It is worth noting that, whenever σ goes to infinity and
thus β goes to 1, condition (12) is never satisfied as X1 < X2. Thus, holding the output and
cost parameters of the model fixed, the dichotomy of the optimal investment region requires
a relatively low volatility of the output price process. As we shall see, this is no longer the
case once one allows the decision-maker to switch from project 1 to project 2.
Examples of investment policies more complex than a simple trigger strategy abound in
the literature. The model of entry and exit by Dixit [6] generates a two-trigger strategy:
the critical output price above which it is optimal to enter an industry is higher than the
one below which it is optimal to exit from it. Similarly, Abel and Eberly [1] show that the
investment policy of a firm under costly reversibility is characterized by a range of inaction
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in which it is optimal neither to purchase nor to sell capital. However, a common feature
of these and related papers is that the lower boundary of the inaction region corresponds
to a disinvestment decision. In our model, by contrast, both p3 and p4 correspond to an
investment decision, albeit in different projects.
A striking feature of the optimal investment strategy is that it may be optimal to invest
in project 1 after a drop in the output price if the output price initially lies in (p3, p4).
Rational investment in a down market can also be triggered by other factors. Competition is
one of them. Grenadier [11] develops a model of strategic exercise of investment options in
which competitors can simultaneously invest when the value of the investment goes down in
an attempt to avoid preemption. De´camps, Mariotti and Villeneuve [4] show that a similar
phenomenon can occur in a single decision-maker context when the drift of the value process
is not known ex-ante. The decision to invest then depends on both the observed current value
of the project and the beliefs about the unknown drift. This generates path dependency in
the optimal investment strategy, and it may be rational to invest after a drop in the current
value of the investment project. As we have shown, this phenomenon can also result from
the interaction between several investment options.
Finally, although we have derived our results for the case of two alternative projects,
it is conceptually straightforward to extend them to an arbitrary number of projects with
output flows X1, . . . ,XN and sunk capital costs K1, . . . ,KN ranked in increasing order. The
analogue of Proposition 2.2 is that it is never optimal to invest when the current output
price corresponds to a point of non-differentiability of the upper envelope of the net expected
discounted profits of investing in each project. As soon as the option of investing in project
N does not dominate all the other investment options, the optimal investment strategy will
be characterized by several disconnected inaction regions, in which the decision-maker waits
in order to determine in which project to invest.
3 Project switching
3.1 The investment problem
In this section, we modify Dixit’s [7] original setup by allowing the decision-maker to switch
from one project to another by incurring the corresponding sunk capital cost. Since project
2 generates a higher output flow than project 1, it is clear that it is never optimal to switch
from project 2, once installed, to project 1. Thus, for a current value p of the output price,
the net expected discounted profit of investing in project 2 is given by V2(p) as above. By
contrast, once project 1 is installed, it is optimal to switch to project 2 if the output price
becomes large enough, as we shall see below. The decision-maker’s investment problem can
then be written as:
Vswitch(p) = sup
τ1,τ2∈T P , τ1≤τ2
E
·
1{τ1<τ2}
µZ τ2
τ1
e−ρtP pt X1 dt− e−ρτ1K1 + e−ρτ2V2(P pτ2)
¶¸
(22)
+ E
£
1{τ1=τ2}e
−ρτ2V2(P
p
τ2)
¤
; p ≥ 0.
Here, τ1 denotes the first time at which the decision-maker invests, whichever project he
selects, and τ2 ≥ τ1 denotes the first time at which he invests in project 2. We shall solve
(22) by dynamic programming techniques. As a first step, this requires computing the value
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of investing sequentially in projects 1 and 2.
3.2 The switching option
To determine the value of investing in project 1, we must first take into account the option
of switching later from project 1 to project 2. Specifically, for a current value p of the output
price, the net expected discounted profit of investing in project 1 is given by:
V s1 (p) = sup
τ∈T P
E
·Z τ
0
e−ρtP pt X1 dt+ e
−ρτV2(P
p
τ )
¸
−K1. (23)
The optimal stopping problem in (23) is standard. In particular, V s1 + K1 is continuously
differentiable on R++ and satisfies the following variational inequalities:
A(V s1 +K1) + pX1 ≤ 0,
V s1 +K1 ≥ V2,
(V s1 +K1 − V2) [A(V s1 +K1) + pX1] = 0,
where the operator A is given by (13). Simple computations then lead to the following explicit
expression for V s1 :
V s1 (p) =



pX1
ρ− µ +
µ
p
ps12
¶β K2
β − 1 −K1 if p ≤ p
s
12,
pX2
ρ− µ −K2 −K1 if p > p
s
12,
(24)
where:
ps12 =
β
β − 1
K2(ρ− µ)
X2 −X1
(25)
is the critical output price level above which it is optimal to switch from project 1 to project
2. By (8) and (25), ps12 > p2. Intuitively, this is because the expected discounted gain from
switching from project 1 to project 2 is less than the expected discounted gain from investing
in project 2 starting from a situation where no project is in place, while the cost to the
decision-maker is the same.
From (1) and (24), V s1 (0) > V2(0) and V
s
1 (p) < V2(p) for any p > p
s
12. Since V
s
1 is convex,
with a slope that is everywhere smaller or equal than the constant slope of V2, there exists a
unique output price level p˜s < ps12 such that V2(p) ≥ V s1 (p) if and only if p ≥ p˜s. Moreover,
since the slopes of V s1 and V2 coincide only on [p
s
12,∞), DV2(p˜s) > DV s1 (p˜s).
Remark. Coming back to problem (22), note that it is clearly suboptimal to invest in
project 1 when the current output price is above ps12, since it would then be optimal to switch
immediately to project 2, and thus investing directly in project 2 is a dominant strategy. In
particular, since ps12 > p2, delaying investment in project 2 is pointless when the current
output price is above ps12.
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3.3 Constrained sequential investment
As a benchmark, it is useful to consider what would happen if the decision-maker were
constrained to invest in project 1 before investing in project 2. His investment problem can
then be written as:
Vseq(p) = sup
τ1,τ2∈T P , τ1≤τ2
E
·Z τ2
τ1
e−ρtP pt X1 dt− e−ρτ1K1 + e−ρτ2V2(P pτ2) ;¸ p ≥ 0. (26)
Here, τ1 denotes the first time at which the decision-maker invests in project 2, and τ2 ≥ τ1
denotes the first time at which he invests in project 2. We solve (26) by dynamic programming
techniques. Given a current output price p, the value of investing in project 1, taking into
account the option to switch later to project 2, is V s1 (p). Hence, in analogy with (10), it
is natural to consider the following auxiliary optimal stopping problem, in which the payoff
function is given by V s1 instead of V1:
Vs1(p) = sup
τ∈T P
E
£
e−ρτV s1 (P
p
τ )
¤
; p ≥ 0. (27)
We have the following result.
Lemma 3.1 For any p ≥ 0, Vseq(p) ≤ Vs1(p).
Our strategy for solving (26) is then as follows. First, we characterize the solution to
(27). Next, we exhibit stopping times τ1 and τ2 which achieve the payoff Vs1(p) in (26), and
are thus optimal given Lemma 3.1.
Compared to (10), the difficulty in (27) is that V s1 is not affine in the current output
price, reflecting the fact that V s1 is itself an option value. One can nevertheless proceed in a
standard way by seeking a value function Vs1 for (27) that is continuously differentiable on
R++ and satisfies the following variational inequalities:
AVs1 ≤ 0,
Vs1 ≥ V s1 ,
(Vs1 − V s1 )AVs1 = 0,
where the operator A is given by (13). Simple computations show that the stopping region
Ss1 = {p > 0 | Vs1(p) = V s1 (p)} for (27) is of the form [ps1,∞), and that two cases can occur:
(i) If X2/X1 < I2/I1 + 1, then:
ps1 =
β
β − 1
K1(ρ− µ)
X1
< ps12. (28)
(ii) If X2/X1 ≥ I2/I1 + 1, then:
ps1 =
β
β − 1
(K1 +K2)(ρ− µ)
X2
≥ ps12. (29)
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In both cases, the value function Vs1 can be written as:
Vs1(p) =



µ
p
ps1
¶β
V s1 (p
s
1) if p ≤ ps1,
V s1 (p) if p > p
s
1.
(30)
We can now exhibit stopping times that achieve the value Vs1(p) in the sequential investment
problem (26), thereby verifying that Vseq(p) = Vs1(p). In case (i), the optimal stopping times
are τ1 = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ≥ ps1} and τ2 = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ≥ ps12}. If P0 < ps12, investment is
sequential: it is optimal to invest in project 1 when the output price reaches ps1, and then
to wait until the output price reaches ps12 to invest in project 2. Note that, in this case, the
optimal investment threshold ps1 for project 1 is equal to p1 as given in (8). Thus investment
in project 1 is myopic, in the sense that it occurs at the same time than if the option of
switching to project 2 were not present, as in Leahy [18]. In case (ii), the optimal stopping
times are τ1 = τ2 = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ≥ ps1}, and the two investments occur simultaneously.
3.4 The optimal investment strategy
We are now in position to solve problem (22). As for (26), we adopt a dynamic programming
approach. Given a current output price p, the value of investing in project 1, taking into
account the option to switch later to project 2, is V s1 (p). Hence, in analogy with (2) and (4),
it is natural to consider the upper envelope of V s1 and V2:
V s(p) = max{V s1 (p), V2(p)}; p ≥ 0, (31)
and the following auxiliary optimal stopping problem:
Vs(p) = sup
τ∈T P
E
£
e−ρτV s(P pτ )
¤
; p ≥ 0. (32)
It should be noted that, in analogy with the basic model, V s is not differentiable at p˜s, with
D+V s(p˜s) = DV2(p˜
s) > DV s1 (p˜
s) = D−V s(p˜s). We have the following result.
Lemma 3.2 For any p ≥ 0, Vswitch(p) ≤ Vs(p).
Our strategy for solving (22) is then as follows. First, we characterize the solution to
(32). Next, we exhibit stopping times τ1 and τ2 which achieve the payoff Vs(p) in (22), and
are thus optimal given Lemma 3.2.
Let us denote by Ss = {p > 0 | Vs(p) = V s(p)} the stopping region for (32), and by
τSs = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ∈ Ss} the associated stopping time. As for (4), τSs is an optimal
stopping time for (32) if Ss is non-empty. We have the following result.
Proposition 3.1 The stopping region Ss for (32) is non-empty.
Proceeding as in Section 2, we first rule out the relatively uninteresting case in which, no
matter the current output price, it is never optimal to invest in project 1 and 2 sequentially,
and τ1 = τ2 = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ≥ p2} are optimal stopping times for (22). A necessary
and sufficient condition for this not to occur is that V s1 (p) > V2(p) for some p ≥ 0. Using
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the explicit formulas (24) and (11) for V s1 and V2, it is straightforward to verify that this
condition is equivalent to:
Xβ1
Kβ−11
>
"
1−
µ
1− X1
X2
¶β# Xβ2
Kβ−12
, (33)
which is weaker than (12). It should be noted that, because β > 1, (33) implies thatK1/X1 <
K2/X2, so that p1 < p2 by (8). In particular, one can check that (33) implies that V
s
1 (p1) >
V2(p1) ≥ V2(p1), so that p1 < p˜s by definition of p˜s. Finally, in terms of the sequential
investment problem (26), we are in case (i), and thus ps1 = p1. We have the following result.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that (33) holds. Then:
(i) The stopping region Ss for (32) is the union of two disjoint intervals [p1, ps3] and [ps4,∞),
where p1 is given by (8) and p
s
3 < p˜
s < ps4;
(ii) The value function Vs for (32) is continuously differentiable on R++ and satisfies the
following variational inequalities:
AVs ≤ 0, (34)
Vs ≥ V s, (35)
(Vs − V )AVs = 0, (36)
where the operator A is given by (13). In particular, Vs coincides with Vseq on [0, ps3],
and ps3 and p
s
4 are characterized by the following value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions:
Vs(ps3) = V s1 (ps3), (37)
Vs(ps4) = V2(ps4), (38)
DVs(ps3) = DV s1 (ps3), (39)
DVs(ps4) = DV2(ps4). (40)
(iii) Vswitch = Vs and the optimal stopping times for (22) are:
τ1 = inf{t ≥ 0 | P pt ∈ Ss},
τ2 = inf
½
t ≥ 0 | P pt ≥ ps4, min
s∈[0,t]
P ps > p
s
3
¾
∧ inf
½
t ≥ 0 | P pt ≥ ps12, min
s∈[0,t]
P ps ≤ ps3
¾
.
In analogy with Proposition 2.2, the bulk of the proof consists to show that the indifference
point p˜s never belongs to the optimal stopping region Ss. The remaining arguments closely
follow those used to prove Theorem 2.1.
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As shown on Figure 2, the value function Vswitch coincides with Vseq on [0, p1], then takes
off from V s1 on (p
s
3, p
s
4) and touches down V2 at the point p
s
4. On the interval [0, p1], Vswitch
is of the form Bs1p
β, where:
Bs1 =
1
pβ1
"
K1
β − 1 +
µ
p1
ps12
¶β K2
β − 1
#
can be easily computed from (24) and (30). On the interval [ps3, p
s
4], it follows from (34)—(36)
that Vswitch is of the form Aspα + Bspβ. The coefficients As and Bs, as well as the critical
investment thresholds ps3 and p
s
4, can be found in principle by solving the value matching and
smooth-pasting conditions (37)—(40) although, as in the basic model, no analytic solution is
available.
6
-
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
¿
p
−K2
−K1
ps1 p
s
3 p˜
s ps4
Figure 2. The value function Vswitch
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3.5 Discussion
In the basic model, the dichotomy of the investment region is not robust to a high volatility
of the output price process, as the option of investing in project 2 uniformly dominates the
payoff of investing in project 1, and thus (12) is no longer satisfied. This is no longer the case
when one allows switching from project 1 to project 2. Indeed, the necessary and sufficient
condition (33) for a dichotomous investment region can be rewritten as:µ
X1
X2
¶βµK1
K2
¶1−β
+
µ
1− X1
X2
¶β
> 1. (41)
14
Note that whenever σ goes to infinity and thus β goes to 1, (41) becomes an equality. Next,
the derivative of the left-hand side of (41) with respect to β at β = 1 is [ln(X1/X2) −
ln(K1/K2)]X1/X2+ln(1−X1/X2)(1−X1/X2) which is positive if K1/X1 < K2/X2 and X1
is close enough to X2. Under those circumstances, (41) still holds for β close to 1, and the
dichotomy of the investment region persists even if the output price process if highly volatile.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Since ρ > µ, the process {e−ρtP pt ; t ≥ 0} is a positive and continuous
supermartingale. In particular, it has a last element, namely 0. Hence, by the optional sam-
pling theorem (Karatzas and Shreve [15, Theorem 1.3.22]), E [e−ρτP pτ ] ≤ p for any stopping
time τ ∈ T P . Noting that there exist positive constants C1 and C2 such that V (p) ≤ C1p+C2
for any p ≥ 0, we therefore have:
E
£
e−ρτV (P pτ )
¤
≤ C1E
£
e−ρτP pτ
¤
+ C2 ≤ C1p+ C2
for any stopping time τ ∈ T P , and thus V(p) ≤ C1p+C2 for any p ≥ 0. It follows in particular
that V(p) is well-defined and finite and, since ρ > µ, that the process {e−ρtV(P pt ); t ≥ 0} is
uniformly integrable and converges almost surely to 0. According to optimal stopping theory,
the process {e−ρ(t∧τS)V(P pt∧τS ); t ≥ 0} is a martingale (El Karoui [9]). Now, suppose that
S = ∅. Then the process {e−ρtV(P pt ); t ≥ 0} is a martingale. Therefore, for any t ≥ 0,
V(p) = E£e−ρtV(P pt )¤≤ C1p e−(ρ−µ)t + C2e−ρt.
Since t is arbitrary and ρ > µ, it follows that V is identically equal to 0, which is absurd as
V ≥ max{0, V1, V2}. Thus S 6= ∅, as claimed. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2.2: Let us define the operator A by (13) and let f = V2 − V1. By
construction, f is a difference of two affine functions which satisfies f(p˜) = 0 and Df(p˜) > 0,
and we have V = V1+max{f, 0}. Since V1 is of class C2 on R++, it follows from Itoˆ’s lemma
and the Itoˆ—Tanaka—Meyer formula (Karatzas and Shreve, [15, Theorem 3.7.1]) that, for any
t ≥ 0,
E
h
e−ρtV (P p˜t )
i
= V (p˜) + E
·Z t
0
e−ρsAV1(P p˜s ) ds
¸
+ E
·Z t
0
e−ρsAf(P p˜s )1{P p˜s ≥p˜} ds
¸
+
1
2
Df(p˜)E
h
e−rtLp˜t
i
,
where {Lp˜t ; t ≥ 0} is the local time for the continuous semimartingale P at p˜. We treat
each term on the right-hand side of this equation separately. For the second term, one has
AV1(p) = −pX1 + ρK1. Hence, for any t ≥ 0,¯¯¯¯
E
·Z t
0
e−ρsAV1(P p˜s ) ds
¸¯¯¯¯
≤ E
·Z t
0
e−ρs
¯¯AV1(P p˜s )¯¯ ds¸
≤ E
·Z t
0
e−ρs(P p˜sX1 + ρK1) ds
¸
=
p˜X1
ρ− µ [1− e
−(ρ−µ)t] +K1(1− e−ρt).
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Since ρ > µ, it follows that:
E
·Z t
0
e−rsAV1(P p˜s ) ds
¸
= o(
√
t).
For the third term, note that there exists positive constants C1 and C2 such that |Af(p)| ≤
C1p+ C2 for p ≥ p˜. Hence, for every t ≥ 0,¯¯¯¯
E
·Z t
0
e−ρsAf(P p˜s )1{P p˜s≥p˜} ds
¸¯¯¯¯
≤ E
·Z t
0
e−ρs
¯¯¯
Af(P p˜s )1{P p˜s ≥p˜}
¯¯¯
ds
¸
≤ E
·Z t
0
e−ρs(C1P
p˜
s +C2) ds
¸
=
C1p˜
ρ− µ [1− e
−(ρ−µ)t] +
C2
ρ
(1− e−ρt).
Since ρ > µ, it follows that:
E
·Z t
0
e−ρsAf(P p˜s )1{P p˜s≥p˜} ds
¸
= o(
√
t).
For the fourth term, note that by the Itoˆ—Tanaka—Meyer formula,
E
h
e−ρt(P p˜t − p˜)+
i
= µE
·Z t
0
e−ρsP p˜s 1{P p˜s ≥p˜} ds
¸
− ρE
·Z t
0
e−ρs(P p˜s − p˜)+ ds
¸
+
1
2
E
h
e−ρtLp˜t
i
.
The first two terms on the right-hand side of this equality can be shown to be on the order
of o(
√
t) by the same reasoning as above. Hence:
1
2
E
h
e−ρtLp˜t
i
= E
h
e−ρt(P p˜t − p˜)+
i
+ o(
√
t)
= e−ρtp˜
½
eµt P
·
W1 ≤
µ+ σ2/2
σ
√
t
¸
− P
·
W1 ≤
µ− σ2/2
σ
√
t
¸¾
+ o(
√
t)
= p˜σ
r
t
2π
+ o(
√
t),
where the second and third equalities follow from a direct computation. Summing up, we
therefore obtain:
E
h
e−ρtV (P p˜t )
i
= V (p˜) + p˜σDf(p˜)
r
t
2π
+ o(
√
t).
Since Df(p˜) > 0, letting t tend to 0 yields that supτ∈T P E [e−ρτV (P
p˜
τ )] > V (p˜). Hence p˜ does
not belong to the stopping region S. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2.1: (i) Let V1 and V2 be the option values for each project as defined
by (10). It is easy to check from (8) that (12) and K1 < K2 imply that p1 < p2 and
V1(p1) > B2p
β
1 = V2(p1). It follows that V 6= V2, and thus S ∩ [0, p˜] 6= ∅. Moreover, by
Proposition 2.2, inf S < p˜. It is clear that for p < p1, V(p) ≥ V1(p) > V1(p), so that
inf S ≥ p1. We now prove the reverse inequality, establishing that inf S = p1. We have:
V(p1) = E
£
e−ρτSV1(P
p1
τS )
¤
≤ sup
τ∈T P
E
£
e−ρτV1(P
p1
τ )
¤
= V1(p1),
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where the first equality follows from the fact that inf S < p˜, and the second from the definition
of p1. Since V(p1) ≥ V1(p1), these quantities are in fact equal, and it follows that p1 ≥ inf S,
as claimed. A similar argument establishes that S ∩ [0, p˜] is an interval [p1, p3], and by
Proposition 2.2, p3 < p˜. We now prove that S ∩ [p˜,∞) 6= ∅. If this were not the case, then
S = [p1, p3], and for any p > p3, we would have:
V(p) = E£e−ρτSV1(P pτS )¤> V2(p),
or, equivalently: µ
p
p3
¶αµ p3X1
ρ− µ −K1
¶
>
pX2
ρ− µ −K2, (42)
where α is the negative root of the quadratic equation (5). For p large enough, (42) is violated,
and we obtain a contradiction. Let p4 = inf S∩ [p˜,∞). By Proposition 2.2, p4 > p˜. Moreover,
it is immediate that p4 ≥ p2, since otherwise waiting until the output price exceeds p2 to
invest in project 2 would secure the decision-maker a strictly greater payoff than investing in
project 2 when the current value of the output price is p4. It then follows by an argument
similar to the one used to prove that p1 = inf S that S ∩ [p˜,∞) = [p4,∞).
(ii) The variational inequalities (15)—(17) characterize V if V is differentiable (Øksendal
[21, Theorem 10.4.1]). We only need to prove this at the investment triggers p1, p3 and p4.
On [0, p1], we clearly have V = V1, and the differentiability of V at p1 follows from a standard
smooth-pasting argument for problem (10). We now prove that DV(p3) = DV1(p3). Since
V ≥ V1 and V(p3) = V1(p3), we have, for any ε > 0,
V(p3 + ε)− V(p3)
ε
=
V(p3 + ε)− V1(p3)
ε
≥ V1(p3 + ε)− V1(p3)
ε
. (43)
Following Karatzas and Shreve [16, Lemma 7.8], let us introduce the stopping times T 1ε =
inf{t ≥ 0 | (p3 + ε)Ht ≤ p3} and T 2ε = inf{t ≥ 0 | (p3 + ε)Ht ≥ p4}, where Ht = exp((µ −
σ2/2)t+σWt) for each t ≥ 0. The stopping time Tε = T 1ε ∧T 2ε is optimal whenever the initial
value of P is p3 + ε. Therefore:
V(p3 + ε) = E
£
e−ρTεV ((p3 + ε)HTε)
¤
≤ V(p3) + E
£
e−ρTε [V ((p3 + ε)HTε)− V (p3HTε)]
¤
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that Tε is not an optimal stopping time whenever
the initial value of P is p3. Up to the term V(p3), the right-hand side of this inequality can
be written as:·
V1(p3)− V1
µ
p23
p3 + ε
¶¸
E
£
e−ρTε1{Tε=T 1ε }
¤
+
·
V2(p4)− V2
µ
p3p4
p3 + ε
¶¸
E
£
e−ρTε1{Tε=T2ε }
¤
.
Using standard results on the Laplace transform of the exit time of a Brownian motion on
a finite interval (Karatzas and Shreve [15, §2.8.C]), together with the continuity of V2, we
obtain that: ·
V2(p4)− V2
µ
p3p4
p3 + ε
¶¸
E
£
e−ρTε1{Tε=T2ε }
¤
= o(ε).
It follows that:
V(p3 + ε)− V(p3)
ε
≤
V1(p3)− V1
µ
p23
p3 + ε
¶
ε
+ o(1). (44)
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Using (43)—(44) and letting ε go to 0, we obtain that D+V(p3) = D+V1(p3), which implies
the result. The proof of the differentiability of V at p4 is similar, and therefore omitted. ¤
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Consider two stopping times τ1, τ2 ∈ T P such that τ1 ≤ τ2. Then, using
the strong Markov property and the definition of V s1 , we obtain that:
E
·Z τ2
τ1
e−ρtP pt X1 dt− e−ρτ1K1 + e−ρτ2V2(P pτ2)
¸
= E
·
e−ρτ1Eτ1
·Z τ2
τ1
e−ρ(t−τ1)P pt X1 dt+ e
−ρ(τ2−τ1)V2(P
p
τ2)−K1
¸¸
= E
·
e−ρτ1Eτ1
·Z τ2−τ1
0
e−ρtP
Ppτ1
t X1 dt+ e
−ρ(τ2−τ1)V2(P
Ppτ1τ2 )−K1
¸¸
≤ E
£
e−ρτ1V s1 (P
p
τ1)
¤
.
The result follows then directly from comparing the objective functions in (26) and (27). ¤
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Consider two stopping times τ1, τ2 ∈ T P such that τ1 ≤ τ2. Then,
proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we obtain that:
E
·
1{τ1<τ2}
µZ τ2
τ1
e−ρtP pt X1 dt− e−ρτ1K1 + e−ρτ2V2(P pτ2)
¶¸
≤ E
£
1{τ1<τ2}e
−ρτ1V s1 (P
p
τ1)
¤
.
Hence, the objective function in (22) is bounded above by:
E
£
1{τ1<τ2}e
−ρτ1V s1 (P
p
τ1) + 1{τ1=τ2}e
−ρτ2V2(P
p
τ2)
¤
= E
£
1{τ1<τ2}e
−ρτ1V s1 (P
p
τ1) + 1{τ1=τ2}e
−ρτ1V2(P
p
τ1)
¤
≤ E
£
e−ρτ1 max{V s1 (P pτ1), V2(P pτ1)}
¤
= E
£
e−ρτ1V s(P pτ1)
¤
,
from which the result follows by (32). ¤
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The proof mimics that of Proposition 2.1, with V s1 , V
s and Vs
instead of V1, V and V. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3.1: (i) The first step of the proof consists to show that p˜s 6∈ Ss. We
proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2.2. Let fs = V2 − V s1 . By construction, fs is
a difference of two convex functions which satisfies fs(p˜s) = 0 and Dfs(p˜s) > 0, and we
have V s = V s1 + max{fs, 0}. Since V s1 is of class C2 on R++ \ {ps12}, and its derivative is
absolutely continuous, it follows from the generalized Itoˆ formula (Krylov [17, §2.10]) and the
Itoˆ—Tanaka—Meyer formula (Karatzas and Shreve [15, Theorem 3.7.1]) that, for any t ≥ 0,
E
h
e−ρtV s(P p˜
s
t )
i
= V s(p˜s) + E
·Z t
0
e−ρuAV s1 (P p˜
s
u ) du
¸
+ E
·Z t
0
e−ρuAfs(P p˜su )1{P p˜su ≥p˜s} du
¸
+
1
2
Df(p˜s)E
h
e−rtLp˜
s
t
i
.
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We treat each term on the right-hand side of this equation separately. For the second term,
since V s1 is of class C2 on (0, ps12), there exists a positive constant C1 such that |AV s1 (p)| ≤ C1
for any p ∈ (0, ps12). For p ∈ (ps12,∞), AV s1 (p) = −pX2+ ρ(K1+K2). Hence, for every t ≥ 0,¯¯¯¯
E
·Z t
0
e−ρuAV s1 (P p˜
s
u ) du
¸¯¯¯¯
≤ E
·Z t
0
e−ρu
¯¯AV s1 (P p˜su )¯¯ du¸
≤ E
·Z t
0
e−ρu[P p˜
s
u X2 + ρ(K1 +K2) +C1] du
¸
=
p˜sX2
ρ− µ [1− e
−(ρ−µ)t] +
µ
K1 +K2 +
C1
ρ
¶
(1− e−ρt).
Since ρ > µ, it follows that:
E
·Z t
0
e−ρuAV s1 (P p˜
s
u ) du
¸
= o(
√
t).
The third and fourth terms can be treated as in the proof of Proposition 2.2, and thus:
E
h
e−ρtV s(P p˜
s
t )
i
= V s(p˜s) + p˜sσDfs(p˜s)
r
t
2π
+ o(
√
t).
Since Dfs(p˜s) > 0, letting t tend to 0 yields that supτ∈T P E [e−ρτV s(P
p˜s
τ )] > V s(p˜s). Hence
p˜s does not belong to the stopping region Ss. Next, as mentioned in the text, (33) implies
that V s1 (p1) > V2(p1). It follows that Vs 6= V2, and thus Ss∩ [0, p˜s] 6= ∅. The remaining of the
proof mimics that of Theorem 2.1(i), with V s1 , Vs1 , Vs, Ss, p˜s, ps3 and ps4 instead of V1, V1, V,
S, p˜, p3 and p4. (Note that ps1 = p1 under (33).) The only point that requires modification
is (42), which becomes:µ
p
ps3
¶α" ps3X1
ρ− µ +
µ
ps3
ps12
¶β K2
β − 1 −K1
#
>
pX2
ρ− µ −K2. (45)
Just as (42), (45) is violated for p large enough, which implies the desired result.
(ii) Noting that V1s = Vseq, the proof mimics that of Theorem 2.1(ii), with V s1 , Vs1 , Vs,
Ss, p˜s, ps3 and ps4 instead of V1, V1, V, S, p˜, p3 and p4.
(iii) It is immediate to check that the stopping times τ1 and τ2 yield the value Vs(p) in
(22). Since Vswitch(p) ≤ Vs(p) for any p ≥ 0 by Lemma 3.2, the result follows. ¤
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